The Impact of NAFTA on Labor Legislation in Mexico by Garduno, Francisco Brena et al.
United States - Mexico Law Journal
Volume 1 The Problems and Prospects of a North
American Free Trade Agreement Article 13
3-1-1993
The Impact of NAFTA on Labor Legislation in
Mexico
Francisco Brena Garduno
Jerome I. Levinson
Steven Paul Weingarten
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/usmexlj
Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, and the
Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals
at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in United
States - Mexico Law Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Francisco B. Garduno, Jerome I. Levinson & Steven P. Weingarten, The Impact of NAFTA on Labor Legislation in Mexico, 1 U.S.-Mex.
L.J. 219 (1993).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/usmexlj/vol1/iss1/13
THE IMPACT OF NAFTA ON LABOR LEGISLATION IN
MEXICO
FRANCISCO BRENA GARDUNO*
I. INTRODUCTION
During his election campaign in April of 1988, President Salinas de
Gortari promised a new Federal Labor Law. To date, however, he has
not given the slightest hint as to when and how he intends to fulfill that
promise. On the basis of that promise, Mexican labor unions dreamed
of and demanded higher salaries, a forty-hour work week, more social
services, better pensions, more contratos-ley (collective agreements declared
to be generally compulsory), unemployment insurance, and an end to
the government's power to seize public service companies in case of strike.
On February 5, 1991, the Presidents of Mexico and the United States
and the Prime Minister of Canada announced the decision to initiate
trilateral negotiations in order to achieve a free trade agreement. Faced
with the challenge of increased competition, the Mexican managerial sector
demanded lower salary increases, payment by the hour, flexibility in the
reduction of personnel, more facilities for temporary employment, less
meddling by the unions in labor relations, fewer collective labor agree-
ments, and a new, more flexible labor law to promote investment.
In view of the uncertainties resulting from the announcement of the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),' the marked dis-
parity in salaries and in industries and technology, the lack of a skilled
work force, and the discrepancy in working conditions and competitive-
ness, Mexican companies found their very survival threatened. Naturally,
some companies recognized the necessity or convenience of taking a stand
and preparing for a wider and more open market and economy with
rapid and dramatic changes. These companies reduced their personnel,
abolished rest periods, and negotiated with the unions for a higher degree
of productivity from the work force.
The unions perceived these preparations by management as jeopardizing
the custom of receiving political privileges and the virtually obligatory
labor benefits for the masses of workers. The unions feared companies
would sacrifice salary increases and changes in working conditions in
* Partner, Brena y Asociados, Mexico City; Professor of Labor Law, Universidad Iberoam-
ericana and Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, 1963-64 and 1968-69; Counsel and member
of the Board of Directors, Confederacion Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (COPARMEX), 1972-
80; Chairman and President, Commission on Legislative Analysis of Employers' Coordinating Board,
1980-85; Author, FEDERAI. LABOR LAW, (Harla); Lic. en Derecho, U.N.A.M.; admitted to Mexican
bar (1957).
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favor of higher productivity. Another union concern was the possibility
of an enormous loss of employment and the problems of adaptation to
new technologies, without receiving, in turn, a substantial improvement
in salaries and living standards. In short, the unions demanded that labor
laws remain unchanged.
The Mexican government, for its part, formalized an objective study
by sectors of the economy to facilitate an adjustment to the planned
economic changes. To facilitate this study, the Advisory Council for
NAFTA was created in order to guide the participation of different
sectors of Mexican society.
II. COOPERATION IN LABOR MATTERS BETWEEN MEXICO,
THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA
The Mexican Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, represented by
Minister Arsenio Farell Cubillas, and the United States Department of
Labor, represented by Secretary Lynn Martin, signed an agreement pro-
viding for an exchange of information relating to labor matters on May
3, 1991. The agreement also contained a plan of action.
The most important points of the agreement are: (1) to develop specific
activities which would be agreed upon later and; (2) to carry out an
exchange of information within the framework of the Bi-national (Mexico-
United States) Commission. The areas of information and cooperation
were to include: (a) safety and hygiene; (b) working conditions, standards,
and their application; (c) solution of labor conflicts; (d) collective agree-
ments for the improvement of working conditions; (e) social security; (f)
credits for household durables and housing; (g) labor statistics; and (h)
quality and productivity. These measures of cooperation would be carried
out utilizing the principles of equity, justice, and mutual benefits, by
studying both labor systems, an exchange of information and statistics,
the organization of conferences and seminars, and the development of
joint projects.
It is important to point out that the activities agreed upon did not
entail obligations in terms of international law; nor does this agreement,
for the moment, contain any specific measures, since any such obligations
would be formalized according to the requirements of an interchange.
The plan of action focused on coordinating statistical methods for eval-
uating employment, salaries, collective contracts, accidents and illness in
the working place, indices of productivity, and the participation of minors
in economic activities. Mexico also signed a similar agreement of intent
with Canada.
III. A COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MEXICAN LABOR
LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION
After a brief analysis of Mexican Labor Laws and their application,
we come to the conclusion that they may be divided into the following
general areas: (1) liberty of association; (2) the right to unionization and
to collective bargaining; (3) heavy labor; (4) minimum age for employment;
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(5) working conditions, including minimum salaries; (6) length of the
working day, vacations, legal participation in profits, yearly bonus, and
days of rest; and (7) safety and hygiene in the working place.
The Mexican system of labor relations is based on the framework of
the Constitution, specifically on Articles 5 and 123, which confirm the
free establishment of labor unions and professional associations of workers
and employers. In addition, Mexico has ratified Agreement No. 87 of
the International Labor Organization ("ILO") on the liberty of associ-
ation. The agreement includes the workers' right to strike. It is interesting
to note that Mexican strike legislation and practices differ from those
in the United States and Canada. For instance, in Mexico, it is possible
for a unionized minority to go on strike, during which all the workers
stop working; however, management may remedy the situation within a
period of seventy-two hours by applying for a declaration that the strike
is "nonexistent." Upon a declaration of nonexistence, workers must
resume their labor within twenty-four hours. The time allowed for pro-
cedure and resolution may be from one hour to one week. If the strike
is declared legal and existent, the labor dispute will be resolved by
negotiations. As for collective bargaining, the "closed shop" is the general
rule.
It is my understanding that the power of unionized labor is propor-
tionally greater in Mexico than in the United States and Canada; con-
sequently, the political power of the unions is also greater. Along the
Mexican border, about ten percent of the workers are unionized; in
Matamoros, Reynosa, and Nuevo Laredo (State of Tamaulipas), prac-
tically 100% of the workers are unionized and earn a minimum salary
of $3.30 (U.S.) per hour. But in the central and other sectors of the
country, thirty percent of the workers are unionized and, according to
my estimate, they earn a minimum hourly salary of $2.20 (U.S.) in the
manufacturing industry. Labor legislation in Mexico is created federally,
whereas in the United States there is separate federal and state jurisdiction,
depending upon the jurisdictional limits within which the subjects of the
labor relations operate.
Mexican legislation has strict prohibitions as to heavy labor for women
and minors; for the latter, it establishes special working conditions. In
case of maternity, women are entitled to ninety days leave with full
salary. For minors of less than sixteen years of age, the workday is six
hours. In Mexico, the legal minimum salary is not paid in factories of
fifteen workers (or less), since these workers prefer to be in the "informal"
work force. Along the border, they earn between $2.00 (U.S.) and $4.00
(U.S.) per hour.
In the United States, salaries are computed by the hour, but in Mexico,
it is done by the day. Yearly salary increases for medium-range executives
are higher in Mexico than in the United States. Additionally, salary levels
of such executives in Mexico are sometimes higher than those in the
United States. In contrast to such discrepancies, the length of the standard
workday is fixed at eight hours maximum in both countries, with relatively
unimportant differences in overtime pay, although overtime pay is some-
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what higher in the United States. In Mexico, there are provisions such
as the Sunday bonus, which is an extra payment of twenty-five percent
above the salary whenever the rest day is not Sunday. The gratuitous
medical services provided by the Institute of Social Security continue up
to two months for workers who lose their jobs.
In the field of safety and hygiene, Mexican legislation provides for
standards in the work place, prevention of fires and provisions for
flammable materials, ventilation, and other more specialized standards,
such as those used in undersea operations. These specific subjects will
be dealt with among the bases for labor cooperation between Mexico
and the United States.
To sum up, because the labor cultures in these two countries have
more points of discrepancy than of agreement, the governments of both
countries have discussed these bases for an understanding in labor matters.
IV. FORESEEABLE IMPACTS IN THE LABOR ASPECT
As the flow of commerce and production increases, more jobs and a
higher demand for labor and services will be created in Mexico. NAFTA
will benefit Mexico by creating more jobs, principally in the border
regions. Due to the shortage of skilled labor in Mexico, however, the
cost of labor will rise rapidly and approach the cost of labor in the
United States. Such a rise will necessarily be preceded by effective training
programs in Mexico. The real problem and the real challenge is to raise
wages and salaries coincidentally with improvements in the quality and
productivity of labor, and with increases in investment.
An optimistic approach leads us to believe that the unions have gradually
ceased to be instruments of political power, turning instead into coor-
dinators between labor and management. The first question is how to
get the unions to take an active part in the increase in productivity, if
major emphasis is given to the training and the real demands and
requirements of the workers. The second question is how to get the
unions to abandon their political ambitions. How do we get the companies
to forget the state subsidies and protection and the authorities to put
their own house in order?
The possible solution is that the unions make an effort to fit into the
model of a professional association in the strictest sense. In the future,
they will have to carry out serious studies on how to achieve a real and
substantial improvement in defense of the real interests of their members.
According to this hypothesis, we will see studies on salaries, an eval-
uation of jobs, and new negotiation strategies adjusted to the changes
in systems and procedures on the part of the unions. Another aspect,
delicate and difficult to eliminate, is the corruption among the union
leaders.
It is expected that Mexico will be able to export almost seventy percent
of its national production and that the United States will be able to
export to Mexico only forty percent of its covered production. As a
consequence, the industrial sectors of Mexico expected to benefit from
(Val. I
NAFTA AND LABOR LEGISLATION IN MEXICO
NAFTA will be the automobile industry, tobacco, textiles, shoes, wood,
cement, glass, petrochemicals, transportation, telecommunications, road-
building, chemicals, garden produce, commerce, franchises, services, non-
metallic minerals, machinery and equipment, and electricity. Actually, we
have been able to observe that these Mexican industries defended them-
selves effectively against the first repercussions from the announcement
of NAFTA.
In contrast to this, those Mexican industries that may be unfavorably
affected by NAFTA are some chemical, pharmaceutical, and high-tech-
nology industries, as well as those in toys, and small and medium sized
enterprises. Small and medium sized industries are the sectors most worried
by the announcement of NAFTA. Faced by this problem, Nacional
Financiera-an agency of the government-guaranteed a support and
financing program for this sector. The high quality of products and
flexibility will keep the small and medium sized enterprises alive.
As for the creation of jobs, it is easy to imagine that the economically
favored areas will generate new sources of employment. In this area,
however, competition again will be an important factor. Mexican industries
and workers will have to compete for productivity and quality; and as
is true in any competition, failing grades will mean elimination. Therefore,
we will not only witness the creation of jobs, but also displacements,
turnovers, and adjustments to the new economic situation of the work
force.
As far as labor rights and NAFTA are concerned, it has already been
shown that Mexican legislation offers a higher degree of protection to
workers than that generally known in the United States and Canada.
This protection is emphasized in the individual relationship regarding
dismissals and one-sided termination of a labor relationship. Within these
relationships, one of the major obstacles to representation of the best
interests of the members in negotiating and carrying out the collective
contracts is the union leaders' corruption and lack of preparation. This
implies a high degree of patience and expense for the management sector.
It appears that current authorities are not preparing any changes in
federal labor laws; but it would not be surprising if some select group
within the government were preparing something along these lines, because
of the promise of President Salinas. To go a bit further, the Employers'
Association of the Mexican Republic is preparing a project demanding
hourly wages, as well as less meddling by the union leaders in daily labor
relations and related matters.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the above analysis and other experiences, we may
conclude that NAFTA will present the following challenges:
(1) For state governors and the federal government to improve the
quality and supply of electricity to industrial enterprises so as to prevent
the interruption of labor; for government to control the recognition of
supposed incapacities to workers by the Social Security Institute; for the
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government to revise the real rates of income tax on salaries because
they may not be competitive; for the government to improve the general
education and training of children and teenagers, tying it to the enterprises;
and to impose responsibility on union leaders when they order illegal
work stoppages or further actions detrimental to production.
(2) For representatives of the employer sector to discipline themselves,
principally in their expenses and leadership, and to strive for better
teamwork with the government and other companies; and for the employer
sector to do a better job of selecting and training their workers, and to
improve salary and incentive systems, relating them to quality, efficiency,
and permanence.
(3) For unions to be more interested in recognizing the companies'
needs and in improving the laborers' working conditions, rather than in
pursuing their ambition to share with the companies the ability to discipline
the workers and to have more political clout.
(4) For workers to develop teamwork; to accept training and more
responsibilities without demanding higher remunerations, either before-
hand or immediately afterwards; to reduce absenteeism; and to have more
self-discipline in their work.
Although I do not possess a crystal ball, I would like to make a few
predictions as to the promised Federal Labor Law. There will be a new
Law before November 1994. This law will have higher economic benefits
for the workers, tied in with the condition of more productivity and, in
some cases, dismissal from jobs due to industrial or market changes.
The new law will stress tangible incentives for training and ongoing on-
the-job education. It will attempt to make the settling and resolution of
conflicts between management, authorities, union, and workers more fluid
and efficient. The law will put restrictions on inter-union conflicts that
lead to work stoppages within companies. The law will support the
function of the union leaders and will encourage them to promote col-
lective negotiations and labor improvement, rather than further personal
and political ambitions. Last, but not least, it will put more order and
discipline into labor relations without affecting social justice or the le-
gitimate rights and liberties of all concerned.
I also expect that those Mexican industries that benefit from NAFTA
will start to create more and better paying jobs with collective negotiations
aimed at the efficiency of the work force. Less favored companies will
be doubly affected and there will be sales, dismissals, and closings. The
adjustment will be dramatic for everybody and it will easily require four
or more years to come to maturity. The state, the investors, the unions,
and the workers will all need to change their customs and adapt themselves
to this and other requirements. Finally, lawyers also will have to contribute
more professionalism, patience, and work discipline.
(Vol. I
COMMENTS ON LABOR LAW IN MEXICO: THE
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THEORY AND REALITY
JEROME I. LEVINSON*
In the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' the Bush
Administration took the position, with respect to labor issues, that Mex-
ican legislation and practices are roughly equivalent to comparable leg-
islation and practices in the United States and Canada, and that whatever
defects exist will be cured by the higher economic growth that will result
from NAFTA. The Bush Administration argued that the Agreement will
permit more resources to be invested in effective monitoring of workplace
safety and labor enforcement standards. In theory and on paper, this is
all true; in practice it is all false.
A key Mexican government agency which deals with the reality of
Mexican labor relations and practices is the Ministry of Labor, headed
by Arsenio Farrel Cubillas. Mr. Cubillas is the only cabinet minister who
spans the administrations of Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas. The
following report describes the role of Farrell Cubillas:
[Mr. Cubillas] has maintained his reputation as a former pro-labor
opponent; he has maintained pressure on the labor sector in an effort
to hold the line of wage demands. [Mr. Cubillas] has not hesitated
in declaring a number of strike actions illegal, thus undercutting their
possibility for success. These and other successful confrontations with
unions have generally served to minimize the gains of labor activism.2
The report goes on to describe the Mexican government's tactics in
the case of the Compania Minera de Cananea, a state-owned mining
company designated for privatization in 1989. The obstacle, as seen by
the government at the time, was that Cananea had an existing labor
contract which was inconvenient in terms of achieving the objective of
privatization. This is how the report described Farrell Cubillas' tactics:
Just before the workers were just about to initiate another strike in
support of collective-bargaining demands, the government announced
the company's bankruptcy and used soldiers to enforce the closure
of the company. The government insisted on the revision of the
* Visiting Scholar, Economic Policy Institute, Washington D.C.; Of Counsel, Arnold & Porter,
Washington, D.C. (1990-1993); General Counsel, Inter-American Development Bank (1977-89); Chief
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77); Special Advisor to President of Inter-American Development Bank (1969-72); Deputy Director
and Assistant Director, Latin American Region Capital Projects, Agency for International Devel-
opment (1962-68); Fulbright Scholar in India (1956-57); Author, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis,
4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 489 (1989); B.A. and J.D., Harvard University; admitted to bars
of New York (1956) and D.C. (1984).
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
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existing Cananea labor contract, a pressure tactic that is similarly
employed in other disputes. Now, Cananea was particularly important
because in Mexico it is historically viewed as the birthplace of Mexican
trade unionism.3
This report, which describes the reality of Mexican labor practices,
was compiled by the United States Embassy in Mexico City.4 Although
very candid and directly contradictory to the information disseminated
by the special U.S. trade representatives as to Mexican labor relations
and practices, the report has now been made public.
These realities are not confined to state-owned companies like Cananea.
They directly benefit foreign investors in Mexico, who have a very
convenient vehicle in the government when they do not like the constraints
of the contracts which they have negotiated with the unions. For example,
Lthe Ford Motor Company unilaterally terminated a plant contract and
dismissed all the workers. A few months later, Ford re-opened the plant,
and re-hired the workers at a lower wage standard and lower benefits.
When the lower benefits were accepted by the union officially associated
with the Confederation of Mexican Workers ("CTM"), the workers at
the Ford plant tried to form a dissident union to regain the benefits
under the original contract. A strike occurred; violence ensued and resulted
in one death on the factory floor and several injuries. No inquiry has
ever been made as to the sources of the violence, but most people
knowledgeable about the case recognize that it was the CTM-affiliated
union which instigated the violence.
A partial replay of the Ford drama took place at the Volkswagen
plant this year; fortunately, however, there was no death or violence.
Volkswagen also unilaterally reduced benefits. Workers from the official
union then tried to form a dissident union to regain the lost benefits.
The Financial Times of London, hardly a radical leftist publication,
described the Mexican government's role in the Volkswagen case as
follows:
The [Mexican] administration was, for example, almost certainly be-
hind Monday's decision by the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration
Board to cancel VW's collective contract with the unions, letting the
company dismiss dissident workers at will and re-hire on its own
terms.'
Again, this is the reality of labor practices in Mexico.
Another notorious case is that of Agapito Cavazos-Gonzales, the head
of the journeyman workers union in Matamoros (which is across the
border from Brownsville, Texas). This is a highly unionized area. Cavazos-
Gonzalez, like most union leaders in Mexico, is no angel; in this respect
he mirrors the union leadership in most of North America, and, one
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Damian Fraser, NAFTA Sets Mexico on the Path to Industrial Unrest: A Push to Raise
Productivity Prompts a Union Backlash, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1992, at 6.
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could say, in some respects the U.S. union movement. He was, however,
an aggressive negotiator on behalf of his membership; indeed, too ag-
gressive for the comfort of the American companies on the border who
had to negotiate with him. These companies sent their lawyers to complain
to President Salinas that Cavazos-Gonzalez was ruining the investment
climate in Matamoros. Within days of the meeting, Cavazos-Gonzalez
was picked up while driving home and bundled on a plane to Mexico
City.
He was grilled throughout the night by two magistrates as to alleged
tax evasion in 1988. This seventy-six year old man began to hyperventilate
and wheeze, so they moved him to a hotel under police-arrest. The
magistrates then transferred him to a hospital under police-arrest. I lost
track of him in June; at that time he was still in the hospital under
arrest. Cavazos-Gonzalez may in fact be a tax-evader, though he denies
it. My point, however, is that you do not pick citizens up in the middle
of the night and bundle them on a plane and grill them through the
night without the benefit of counsel or contact with representatives of
his union or his family. That is the reality of the Salinas government
approach. It is the government's policy to assure a low wage, stable
labor environment conducive to attracting foreign investment, enforced
by the kind of strong arm tactics outlined above. These are unfair labor
practices which, in turn, constitute unfair investment incentives to attract
foreign investment, such as American investment, to Mexico.
It is naive in the extreme to believe that American companies do not
know that they can take advantage of this policy and the tactics which
have been described. The United States negotiators for NAFTA, however,
propose not to recognize that there is even a problem. NAFTA does not
contemplate the creation of a social policy, as is the case with the European
Community ("EC"). Therefore, the United States administration is at-
tempting to compartmentalize the labor relations issue from the trade
issue. NAFTA, however, is more than a trade agreement. It is a trade
and investment agreement, and part of the investment climate which
Mexico has created involves this low wage labor stability, which is enforced
by strong-arm tactics. It constitutes, in my view, an unfair investment
incentive, which should have been addressed as an integral part of the
NAFTA negotiations. The dirty secret of the NAFTA negotiations is the
failure to address this question of what constitute fair and unfair labor
practices, which in turn amount to fair and unfair investment incentives.
In his paper, Francisco Brefia Gardufio points out that Mexico has
ratified Agreement #87 of the International Labour Organisation ("ILO")
Convention on the liberty of association.6 Mexico, therefore, nominally
adheres to international standards of agreed labor relations practices
among industrialized countries. I believe that NAFTA should include a
provision which refers to the ILO Convention and makes it an integral
6. Francisco Brefta Gardufio, The Impact of NAFTA on Labor Legislation in Mexico, I U.S.-
MEx. L.J. 220, 221 (1993).
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part of the Agreement, and therefore actionable under the dispute set-
tlement resolutions provisions. There is no reason and no logic, as far
as I can see, why it is legitimate to negotiate aggressively to protect the
intellectual property rights of American companies through incorporation
by reference of four international conventions in Chapter 17, the Intel-
lectual Property Chapter of NAFTA, while ignoring basic worker rights
in Mexico.
I believe that some of the practices outlined above are unfair labor
practices and therefore constitute unfair investment practice. This is unfair
to American workers. By ignoring this issue, the NAFTA negotiators for
the Bush Administration have simply relegated workers' rights to a lesser
plane than the protection of the intellectual property rights of American
corporations. There is no logical reason for distinguishing between the
two, except the political decision that workers' rights are less important
than the intellectual property and other rights which were so vigorously
negotiated as part of the NAFTA negotiation.
I hardly need to point out that this is an unpopular, and a distinctly
minority, view in Washington. In my view, NAFTA will go through
Congress without significant reference to this issue. What Francisco Brefia
Gardufio has described, very accurately, as the Agreement for Consul-
tation-the exchange of information that Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin
negotiated with Farrel Cubillas-is nothing more than a joke. It is totally
without any credibility, especially in light of what I have described as
the reality of Farrel Cubillas and the Mexican Labor Ministry's role in
labor disputes. I think this is a fatal flaw in NAFTA, and if it were
up to me, I would vote NAFTA down on this ground alone, unless the
issue were addressed by making the ILO Convention language a part of
NAFTA by reference.
In conclusion, I want to note that while it is true that we are not
trying to create a European Community type of agreement and relationship
under NAFTA, a lesson might be learned from the EC members' requiring
Spain and Portugal to conform their basic institutions, including their
labor relations, to elementary democratic standards. The EC has developed
a social charter and has rejected explicitly the concept of what they refer
to as social dumping; namely, the deliberate maintenance of lower work
place standards and workers' rights as a device for attracting investment.
What is wrong with NAFTA is that it institutionalizes social dumping.
What we have is a deliberate policy of the Mexican government to maintain
wages, which makes Mexico competitive with East Asian competitors and
thereby attracts American investment. That is social dumping and it ought
to be rejected, just as it was rejected by the European Community.
(Vol. 1
OBSERVATIONS OF A U.S. LABOR UNIONIST AND
FORMER NEWS REPORTER IN MEXICO
STEVEN PAUL WEINGARTEN*
I have had experience in United States-Mexico labor relations as an
American correspondent in Mexico from 1983 until early 1987 for the
Cox News Chain. I also have had experience in labor relations as Com-
munications Director for a labor union representing 43,000 workers in
Los Angeles County. These workers include public sector employees,
nurses, librarians, and welfare workers. Because of my encounters as a
correspondent and as a member of a large labor union, I can see that
there are profound changes underway in Mexico.
I was glad to learn that Francisco Bario was sworn in as Governor
of Chihuahua. I covered the Chihuahua election of 1986, in which he
was defeated. I walked away feeling that a massive fraud had been
perpetrated and that we would never see the end of it. I am glad to see
that Mr. Bario and the Panistas stayed in the race, followed it up, and
did not get disheartened as in other Mexican states.
Winners and losers aside in Chihuahua, Sonora, or Oaxaca, I was very
impressed with Mr. Bario, whom I had met when he was Mayor of
Ciudad Juarez. When I interviewed him at that time and during the
gubanatorial election, I found that he represented a new generation of
Mexican political leaders. He is someone with a nimble mind and good
training who was very frank and eloquent with reporters. Previously,
Mexican politicians generally tended to shut us off, to keep us at the
door and to deal with the national press in a manipulative way. They
were preaching to the choir for domestic use, and only the President
and a bold handful of others would speak to the foreign press.
During four and one-half years of covering the "stocks and bombs"
beat in Mexico City, however, I found that a new generation of Mexican
professionals had grown up and extended itself across virtually every area
of economic and political life. This is true in all three political blocks,
left, conservative, and the center Partido Revolucionario Institucional
("PRI"). I found that business, university, and even labor people across
the country are working with American university people on ecological,
medical, and engineering projects.
This has not always been the case. For example, after the 1983 Cobalt
60 spill in Juarez-the worst nuclear disaster in North American history-
I investigated Mexico's nuclear industry. I found many legal violations,
* Publication Director, Local 660, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, Los
Angeles, California; Bureau Chief, Cox News Service, Mexico City, 1984-88; President, Mexico City
Foreign Press Association, 1986-87; Journalist, L.A. TimEs, Mexico City, 1983-86; B.A. and Certificate
of Latin American Studies, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1983; currently candidate
for J.D. degree, Loyola University School of Law, Los Angeles, California.
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even though very good laws were on the books. The problems seemed
to be enforcement, review, and the plain ignorance on the part of people
handling radioactive material. People were losing radioactive devices
throughout the country. When I was moved to Texas, and covered the
same story for the Austin American Statesman, I found that the problem
existed on both sides of the border.
More recently, however, I have seen a trend toward efficiency and
international cooperation. For example, on September 19, 1985, Mexico
City lost 5,000 hospital beds, one-third of the capital's capacity, in two
and one-half minutes of horrific earthquake. I saw UCLA medical center
personnel led by one doctor from Mexico City rush in with open arms
and suitcases full of medical supplies to begin an emergency airlift. Over
time they moved from the emergency phase to a rebuilding phase, and
UCL A Medical Center eventually adopted Mexico City General Hospital.
This reflects an important change in the relationship of the people of
the United States to the people of Mexico.
I saw this same pattern of ties deepening, especially in nongovernmental
organizations, across the spectrum of life. It is especially strong in the
southwest United States and northern Mexico. Consequently, I think that
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' is a case of
the tail wagging the dog. NAFTA is a part of a process that has been
generating momentum for many years. In fact, when I arrived in Mexico
City there were sixty foreign correspondents, twenty of whom were
American. In 1987 the press corps had increased four-fold to 240, with
sixty Americans based full-time in Mexico City. The perception of Mexico
in American eyes has changed.
I would like to refer to the AFL-CIO's weekly newspaper from March
4, 1991, when the NAFTA debate was on the fast track.2 The dateline
is Bar Harbor, Florida, where the labor leaders regularly gather. Labor
pledged to join with its environmental and consumer allies to fight the
proposed agreement on every front: in the halls of Congress, in corporate
board rooms, and in the court of public opinion. The article quotes
AFL-CIO Secretary Treasurer Thomas Donahue as saying that what the
Bush Administration proposed was a fundamental restructuring of the
economics of the North American Continent. Donahue went on to say
that the Office of the United States Trade Representative wanted to push
the Agreement through in six months, keeping everyone in the dark and
giving Congress no chance to debate about or alter the Agreement.
Donahue warned that unless the union and its allies could get the proposal
off of the fast track, the Administration could ram through an agreement.
that would expand the maquiladores, "which is an absolute disaster for
workers in the United States and Mexico." '
I believe that these sentiments are not very accurate, but one thing is
extremely telling. When the AFL-CIO leadership talks about fighting on
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
2. Michael Byrne, All Out Fight to Halt Mexico Pact, AFL-CIO NEws, Mar. 4, 1991, at 1.
3. Id.
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every front, they forget about the workplace. They mentioned the halls
of Congress, the corporate board rooms, and the court of public opinion.
The problem with this threat, however, is that it is made by a bunch
of old white men with a cold warrior focus on Europe. Mexico is the
neighbor of the American southwest. The union leadership's focus is very
much removed, both in composition and in thought, from the workers
they represent.
In addition to union leadership, proponents of NAFTA will have a
hard time selling it in Southern California. There is a $588 million shortfall
in the budget of California. Southern California in the last year has lost
more than 500,000 jobs. Today, one out of seven residents of Los Angeles
County receives some sort of public assistance, an increase of forty
percent from last year. In the public mind, NAFTA will speed up this
increase in unemployment. Jobs are leaving California. More of them
go to the deep South or to Arizona than to Mexico, but public perception
is different. It would have helped if labor had been asked for its input
on this. Linda Powers states that the Bush Administration worked closely
with Congress.' The Administration, however, did not work closely with
the labor unions at any level.
Finally, I believe that the future will bring more internal struggle within
both the American and Mexican labor movements. There is already a
new generation of Latino labor leaders. For example, my union has a
thirty-eight-year-old Chicano leader and now consists of 43,000 public
sector workers. This is a bilingual generation of workers with family ties
going back to Mexico. One will find more Mexican workers who have
had good experiences with American labor unions returning to Mexico
and who demand changes within the Mexican union structure. After years
of being shop stewards in American unions, they will be trained in how
to spot problems in health and safety agreements. They will have support
from their union brothers and sisters still in the United States. Whether
this fight is fought in Congress or in the court of public opinion will
have very little bearing on what goes on at the workplace level. Just as
you have a common language among lawyers and engineers, you will
see a common language among union members. American unions already
have very tight links with Canadian labor. It is long overdue for us to
work with our Mexican colleagues.
4. See Linda Powers, NAFTA and the Regulation of Financial and Other Services, 1 U.S.-
MEx. L.J. 65.
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DISCUSSION OF THE IMPACT OF NAFTA ON LABOR
AND LABOR LAW
QUESTION: What has been the Canadian government's reaction to the
Mexican labor policy you described?
ANSWER, Mr. Levinson: A lot of Canadian workers and others blame
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, for a deepening of the recession
that they are in and for the loss of jobs. Thus, I do not know whether
the Canadian government shares the view of the U.S. government, which
is that the impact of labor is not an issue to be discussed as part of
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),2 or that it is
an issue to be put aside with the kind of cosmetic agreement that Francisco
Brefia Gardufio described between Lynn Martin and Farrell Cubillas. The
real issue is what people think in the Canadian workplace and in Canadian
public opinion, and that seems to be turning against both the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA.
QUESTION: Can you explain the recent Volkswagen strike in Puebla?
How was the company legally able to dismiss all of its workers?
ANSWER, Lic. Garduuio: As far as I have been informed, the labor
union was divided into two groups. The legal representation signed an
agreement with the company to accept the revision of the contract. When
they went back to work, another group of workers then opposed them
and the company could not reinitiate their operations. According to the
law, that is force majeure or an act of God. Some say "Why? If I
cannot continue to perform my duties because of an act of God, it is
beyond my responsibility." The company started to negotiate with the
two groups again to see if they could resolve more. The company's
position was that, according to law, they were entitled to terminate these
relations because of the force majeure. The workers then have the right
to file an Amparo proceeding. The real problem, in this case, is that
the labor conflicts are influenced by a lot of politics. There are a lot
of interests involved which are not legitimate, not really concerned with
the improvements of the working conditions or with the company.
ANSWER, Mr. Levinson: Might I just amplify that by again quoting
from that left-wing journal, the London Financial Times, "NAFTA has
forced VW to take a tough stand with its union, provoking the dispute." 3
1. Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
353 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).
2. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
3. Damian Fraser, Mexico Sets Mexico on the Path to Industrial Unrest, FIN. TtMas, Aug. 19,
1992, at 1.
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ANSWER, Lic. Gardulo: It seems very suspicious to me that the jour-
nalists are better informed than the lawyers involved in the dispute, that
the journalists would have investigated all of the cases and to have the
truth. This is very strange, but, at least in this case, it looks to me like
that is what happens in Mexico. Sometimes people come and tell me
that the Mexican government disclosed in Washington or London that
something is going to happen, or the way something happened. I ask
why would the Mexican government prefer to give the first-hand news
to these people rather than to Mexican interests? Mexico, as you know,
is a country that is having some success even with all of these accusations.
